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Abstract
Modern computer systems are complex. Even in the best of conditions, it can be difficult to
understand the behavior of the system and identify why certain actions are occurring. Existing
systems attempt to provide insight by reviewing the effects of actions on the system and estimating
their cause. As computer systems are strongly driven by actions of the user, we propose an
approach to identify processes which have interacted with the user and provide data to which
system behaviors were caused by the user. We implement three sensors within the graphical
user interface capable of extracting the necessary information to identify these processes. We
show our instrumentation is effective in characterizing applications with an on-screen presence,
and provide data towards the determination of user intentions. We prove that our method for
obtaining the information from the user interface can be done in an efficient manner with minimal
overheads.
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1 Introduction
Modern computer systems have advanced to the point where the cause of activity on a host is
not always clear. Existing security and audit systems leverage limited information in attempts
to describe and judge the legitimacy of system behavior without knowing if the observed actions
are intended by the user. These systems focus only on logged behavior in well defined spaces, for
example: process execution stats, network traffic, and file accesses. However, as computer systems
are driven by the user, these system should also consider the actions of the end-user. Our approach
instruments the graphical user interface (GUI) to determine which processes interact with the user
and to extract the context of the interaction towards an understanding of user-endorsed actions
on a system.
Existing approaches try to gain an understanding of actions occurring on a system by focusing on
the symptoms of the actions and attempt to work backward. These approaches have studied system
call data to determine the application’s intended purpose is. Other systems take this approach
further and attempt to determine if an application is acting maliciously through patterns of system
calls and heuristics of file accesses [1, 2].
These approaches have mixed success as they have no data on what the user’s actions were.
A similar approach attempts to incorporate the user somewhat indirectly by approving network
connections only within a certain time window after detecting activity on the keyboard [3]. Another
approach specifically looks for an open or save file dialog box prior to allowing a process to edit
files [4]. All these approaches fall short of understanding the user interaction with processes and
as such attempt to use just parts of the interaction to provide marginal benefits. Our approach
aims to record the full interaction between a user and system processes.
We place our focus on processes and how they interact with the user. With modern systems being
driven by user, the user will be the root of many actions occurring on a system. We aim to capture
the interactions of the user with the system by instrumenting the graphical user interface. All
processes wishing to communicate with the user must appear on the screen, and in order to receive
commands from the user they must be able to accept data from the keyboard and mouse. In
order to have a screen-presence processes must engage existing libraries and subsystems to convert
text and graphical commands into objects displayable on the shared resource of a screen. Further,
an application must also utilize system interfaces to be notified of incoming user input from the
keyboard and mouse. We take advantage of these requirements and place instrumentation within
the interfaces a process must interact with to achieve user interaction.
By collecting and storing data from the GUI we are able to provide data towards a number of
interesting applications. For example, our data collection could be employed for widely deployed
usability testing, similar to how applications such as Firefox collect data on how users interact with
their windows [5], our instrumentation could provide insights into how users navigate the entire
operating system. Our instrumentation could also be used towards the auditing of user activity
and which applications a user engages with. This could be particular useful for organizations
investigating reports of misuse, or simply for the gathering of application usage metrics to decide
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if it is worth renewing licenses for expensive programs. Additionally, our data could be leveraged
towards providing extra insight into a system’s operations when evaluating a security policy. In
particular, gathered user interaction data could be sent to a network controller when determining
if an application should be permitted to contact a server holding confidential data.
We implement our approach in the Ubuntu Linux distribution and as such frame our discussions
around the details of the Ubuntu platform [6]. Our decision to use the Linux-based platform was
due to the open-source model of the Linux kernel, the Ubuntu platform, and all of the libraries
included in the distribution’s packaged release. Additionally, building our approach within the
open-source platform would not be hindered by unavailable APIs or licensing restrictions. Despite
our decision, we do note that our general approach and data gathering is applicable to other
operating systems.
Figure 1: A high-level view of the information flow to and from the user. The three sensors, labeled
Kernel, X11, and GTK+, will be placed within these components handling the flow of information
allowing the extraction of data.
To extract the information necessary to make these distinctions, we created a three-sensor system
as visualized in Figure 1. Each of the three sensors is located within a key portion of Ubuntu’s
graphics processing stack. We place a sensor within the kernel (the “kernel sensor”), another built
into the X.Org implementation of the X Window System (the “X11 sensor”) [7], and the final
sensor within the untrusted user space graphics library GTK+ (the “GTK+ sensor”) [8]. These
three discrete sensors will hold differing levels of detail, all of which are required for our approach:
the kernel records the reading of input devices, the windowing system tracks which applications
appear on the screen and receive data; and the graphics toolkits render text on the screen. At each
stage in the procedure, to either display an object on the screen or deliver user input a process,
our sensors will log the extracted information and archive the data to disk. In all, we monitor user
keyboard and mouse input, observe which programs receive user input, note applications which
appear on the screen, and record contextual information for displayed processes. Furthermore, as
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the graphics toolkits reside fully under the end-user’s control, we will verify and correlate data
extracted across all three sensors to ensure consistency.
In addition to our own instrumentation, we also leverage the Linux Auditing Subsystem to record
the actions the kernel performed on behalf of running processes. The Linux Auditing Subsystem
is a set of functions within the kernel capable of tracking a number of different events typically
employed to meet audit compliance regulations [9]. For our purposes we request the Auditing
Subsystem to record the system calls invoked by each process that is not owned by root. With
the audit data in hand we aim to link high-level user actions to the low level results; for example,
when the user presses a button we observe the process perform some series of system calls in
response.
In summary, the contributions of this thesis are:
• High Performance Monitoring of the GUI: We create and evaluate three high perfor-
mance and low-overhead sensors capable of monitoring the entire graphical interface. Our
sensors do not cause noticeable delay in a system and are designed for deployment across an
organization.
• Identification of Processes Reading Input Devices: Through the creation of our own
kernel module, we monitor requests from processes to receive keyboard and mouse data. If
the request is approved, we record the amount of data each process receives from the user
input devices.
• Metrics for Process-User Interaction: Through small modifications to the X Windowing
System, we can detemine which processes have a screen presence, the quantity of information
transmitted to the display, the amount of user input a process receives, and even which
keyboard characters were received by the process.
• Application independent context extraction: Through instrumentation in the GIMP
Toolkit (GTK+) graphics library, we extract both text and widget hierarchy information
representing the graphical state of applications with a screen presence. By altering the
GTK+ library, we are able to provide this context without changes to applications while
efficiently extracting information with high accuracy.
• A method for verification of an untrusted sensor: By trusting the kernel and display
manager sensors, we will explore overlaps to verify the data recorded by the GTK+ sensor.
We enumerate both the indicators of valid recorded data and indicators of incorrect data.
• A characterization towards identifying user-initiated behavior: Based on our gath-
ered sensor data, combined with audit logs from the Linux Auditing Subsystem, we propose
characterizations for the identification of user-initiated process behavior.
We now introduce each sensor in greater detail and discuss the data each sensor is responsible for
extracting.
The Kernel Sensor is implemented as a kernel module and resides within kernel space. By inter-
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cepting the open, read, and close system calls we are able to monitor each processes’ use of the
input devices. For example, when a user moves the mouse or types on the keyboard, the kernel
will register data flowing in from the hardware and provide the information to any process which
has opened the input devices for reading. By tracking which applications have opened the devices,
and by logging the number of bytes read from each device, our kernel sensor is able to indicate
which processes are receiving the raw user input. We estimate that the most frequent consumer
of the raw data will be the windowing system.
The X11 Sensor is strategically placed within the code of the X Windowing System. Responsible for
multiplexing the screen, the X Windowing System’s Server (abbreviated “XServer”) communicates
with connected client processes (abbreviated “XClients”) to process display requests and deliver
events. The XServer handles the placement of on-screen windows, updating of displayable objects,
and dispatching input events to the appropriate XClients. We place instrumentation within the
XServer to log both the delivery of user-input events, and the application requests for displaying
information on the screen. Unfortunately, these display requests are usually already rendered
images and, as such, it is not possible to extract further information about what the process is
displaying.
The GTK+ Sensor is an untrusted sensor, since it is instrumented within the user-controlled
graphics library GTK+. This library, although is ultimately owned by root, is executed under the
end-user’s permissions. This raising the possibility of either data manipulation or outright lying
to trick our sensor into logging information which is irrelevant. Despite this possibility though,
we instrumented the graphical library to gain access to the rich contextual information available.
For example, when an application based upon GTK+ creates a new text object, we are able to
log the text to a file. Similarly, when a process creates a new button, we are able to log the
parent-child relationship and pull out the child’s text for further review. Once a process feeds
GTK+ the information it wants displayed, GTK+ rendered the graphical objects and presents an
image ready to be processed by the X Windowing System.
Using these sensors, we aim to study how data being reported from each sensor relates to one
another while recording actions from a process. In particular, how information from the X11 and
Kernel sensors relate to the data reported by the GTK+ sensor. For instance, when a user types
into an editable text box displayed on the screen, the pressed keys will be detected by the kernel
sensor, processed by the X11 sensor, and then the same text will often be logged as rendered on
the screen by the GTK+ sensor.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section we discuss both recent best practices in computing and work related to our approach.
We focus on work aimed at understanding actions on the system and work utilizing user interactions
to provide legitimacy to observed actions.
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2.1 Least User Privileges
Similar to the compartmentalization of confidential information, organizations often deploy user
workstations with a minimal set of allowed user permissions. By restricting users to the least
amount of access possible the overall integrity of the system can remain intact, even if a user account
is compromised. This approach to security is commonly referred to as “least user privileges” [10].
This is typically deployed so that users do not have administrative access to their own machines
and therefore cannot install new programs, alter the system configuration, or otherwise elevate
themselves to ‘root-level’ permissions. In doing so, the operating system can be protected against
malware infections and the occasional careless action by a user. Under the conditions of this model,
users also cannot circumvent any administratively-applied constraints or monitoring systems such
as our graphical interface sensors.
2.2 Detecting Abnormal Behavior
Work related to ours focuses on detecting anomalous behavior and attempting to determine if the
abnormal actions are malicious in nature. The Panorama system created by Yin et al. constructs
a virtualized testing host with system-wide sensitive data tainting to run suspect programs. If
sensitive data is handled inappropriately (e.g. a program attempts to send it out a network socket)
Panorama marks the program malicious [11]. Similarly, Siren runs suspect programs by emulating
an environment in which there is an active user performing routine tasks. Malware which attempts
to blend in with normal behavior can be detected by noticing deviations between test runs. Both
of these approaches rely on dedicated testing environments, our approach aims to be deployed on
an end-user system and perform dynamic identification of suspect behaviors [12].
Other previous work took a different approach, one which was more dynamic and run on the
end-host itself. The work by Hofmeyr et. al., was able to detect differences in system calls pat-
terns between benign programs and ones with malicious intent [2]. However, a newer research
paper, AccessMiner, claims that looking solely at patterns of system calls cannot reliably detect
malware. Instead, AccessMiner logged system calls from nearly a dozen lab systems and studied
read/write attempts to detect malicious programs operating outside of normal file access pat-
terns [1]. While quite successful with malware which perform file access, AccessMiner detection
capabilities is restricted to malware that attempts to alter files normally in other program’s system
files. Furthermore, both of these papers can only attempt to detect patterns without any idea of
what the intended end goal is; our approach will provide data towards attempting to infer the
user’s goal by how he/she interacts with on-screen applications.
Similarly, user-profiling approaches study user action as seen through the effects of their interaction
with a system. Approaches in this area have attempted to use features like event frequency, event
patterns, and the duration of interaction [1, 2, 13]. The creators of such approaches have studied
these user effects through a number of means, such as Markov Chains, Na´’ive Bayes classifiers,
and Support Vector Machines [14–19]. Instead of looking at the after-effects of user actions, our
approach studies the interaction directly as seen by the graphical user interface. We aim to provide
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the information gathered to the analytic models of the related works for more accurate models of
user activities.
2.3 Inferring User Intentions
In order to learn of the user’s intention while the user is working towards some goal, certain systems
have proposed that either the operating system, the GUI manager, or even both be redesigned to
support extra windows asking for a confirmation when dealing with sensitive operations. Perhaps
the most widely experienced occurrence of this approach are the security confirmations for modern
iOS or Android cell phone platforms when an application wishes to use certain components, such
as the location or camera subsystems [20,21]. A number of previous works describe how a similar
system could be created for end-host systems, either by some sort of dialog box [22], or by having
certain system-controlled user interface icons that allow access when activated by a user [23].
These approaches are beneficial, but require the cooperation of all user-facing applications and
are therefore difficult to implement on a large scale. Our approach is to perform system changes
without requiring any alterations to client applications.
Approaches most similar to ours are passive observation techniques which monitor the state of the
GUI and record input received from the user to aid in security decisions. Notably, the work by
Cui et al. receives raw mouse/keyboard events and uses this information to only allow outgoing
network connections from processes recently provided input by the user [3]. Shirely et al., takes
this approach a bit further and applies it to standard filesystem tasks as well; for example, if
the user interacts with a save-file dialog, allow the process to write to the file [4]. Another work
simply captured an image of the user’s screen and applied optical character recognition (OCR)
to determine the contents of the interface [24, 25]. Our approach aims to get even more detail by
extracting all displayed text from the GUI and correlate this data with system actions to infer the
user’s intent.
2.4 Detecting User-Interaction
A number of works have created systems varying in complexity to detect the interaction of a
user. Some approaches simply detect generic events within the kernel from the input devices (e.g.,
keyboard, mouse) and leverage the presence of such an event to validate high-level actions, such as
a network request [26]. Other approaches focus on specific programs, such as Firefox, and observe
user-interactions and subsequent actions [27,28]. Further approaches perform both kernel-level and
application-level logging to validate actions [29–31]. While these approaches many overlap with
small portions of our approach, we aim to provide more detail than these approaches combined
through our three-sensor instrumentation of the graphical interface.
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2.5 Correlation of Sensors at Separate Trust Levels
There have been many approaches to correlating, aggregating, and detecting abnormalities in
collected data in previous work. Some work needing only simple extraction from system call logs
relied on regular expressions [4], while other work used a n-gram approach to create buckets of
incoming system log data for further processing [1]. Work attempting to detect masquerading
have used Bayes classifiers [15,16] and also have applied Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [17,19].
Further work have used Markov models, or simply have customized their own solution to best fit
their data and approach [2, 3]. Our approach will indicate ares of overlap between our trusted
sensors and untrusted sensors to provide data for the application of these works to detect possible
misinformation.
3 Trust Model
Our approach will assume least user privileges, which means an end-user has no administrator or
root-level capabilities [10], and that neither the kernel nor root-level applications can be compro-
mised by an adversary. We will further assume that there are no successful privilege escalation
attacks by an unprivileged user to obtain root-level permissions. We will extend this to mean
that anything running in the kernel, or with root permissions is inherently trusted, while all other
applications are not. We assume that there are no resource exhaustion attacks launched, both in
terms of a network-based denial of service, and also host-based exhaustion attacks like filling the
hard drive with data. Finally, we also assume that the user is trustworthy, i.e. there are no insider
threats. We do allow for any code to be run under user permissions, whether it be run legitimately
by the user, or malware crafted by some adversary.
We explicitly place the kernel within our trusted computing base. With the kernel being the most
heavily protected part of the operating system, we believe this assumption of integrity reasonable.
This assumption is also made by anti-virus and similar modern security solutions. While other
approaches, such as virtual machine introspection [32] could aid in relaxing this assumption, we
leave such an approach to future work.
4 First Sensor: Kernel
The first of our sensors for identifying user interactions with processes is our kernel sensor. By
monitoring and extracting information from communications between processes and the kernel, we
can determine which processes have read input from any attached user-input device (e.g. mouse,
keyboard, tablet). We store all information to a log for processing in realtime or for later auditing.
Our sensor is implemented as a loadable kernel module, which has minimal overhead both in terms
of memory space and computational performance.
11
4.1 Approach
Our first sensor is the kernel sensor. The kernel is the core part of the modern operating system.
It is responsible for creating the layer of abstraction between the raw hardware and applications
which wish to engage in its use. It handles the allocation and distribution of computer resources,
such as processing time and memory space, and creates a consistent API and environment for
processes each time they are started. The kernel is responsible for securing the system; therefore
we must explicitly trust the kernel in our approach. Any program wishing to interact with the
hardware must first engage the kernel; as such, our approach instruments the kernel to record the
requests to access the input devices.
When programming on modern operating systems, there are a set of “system calls”. These calls
are particular procedures invoked by applications, often dealing with protected or shared resources,
which will ‘call’ the system to execute kernel-level code to fulfill a request. These are required so
that the kernel can enforce security policies, ensure no two processes attempt to edit the same
resource at the same time, and provide a seamless layer of abstraction over vastly different hard-
ware. For example, if a process would like to open a file, it is required to invoke the open system
call which will validate the requesting process has permissions to access the file, ensure the file is
not already in use, and allocate resources for the correct hardware to interact with the file. Our
kernel sensor leverages these necessity of these system calls to track which processes have requested
information from the input-devices.
To be effective, our kernel sensor’s code needs to reside within the bounds of the kernel’s protected
space. To achieve this we wrote a loadable kernel module capable of performing the logging our
approach requires. While the same goal can be obtained through modification of the kernel code
itself, we decided on a kernel module for the ease of programming and to allow our approach to
easily used on any machine running a current version of the Linux kernel. Our module intercepts
three system calls vital to the use of the input devices: open, read, and close. Upon each
intercepted invocation of the open system call we review the parameters of the call for file paths
dealing with the input devices (e.g. /dev/input/), and log the request. For each interception
of the other two calls, we review a data structure we maintain to determine if the system call
is dealing with an already opened input device. This information can then indicate exactly how
much input was requested by processes and subsequently delivered by the kernel.
4.2 Implementation
To capture the applications which aim to capture input from an end-user, we identified the two
paths created by the kernel through which processes can access the input devices. These paths,
/dev/input and /dev/tty, are part of the peusdo-filesystem maintained by the kernel for providing
processes with a way to interact with the hardware abstraction powered by the kernel. In order
to actually obtain data from these paths though, the process must invoke the standard file access
system calls. As such, we are particularly interested in the open, read, and close system calls
when they are called on these paths. When a process performs such an action, it is a clear indicator
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that the process wishes to receive data from the input devices. In order to log this information,
our approach studied two possible routes: using the Linux Auditing Subsystem, or System Call
Interception.
Our first possible implementation route was through the Linux Auditing Subsystem. The auditing
system is a series of logging functions embedded within the code of the kernel capable of logging
a number of events being processed by the kernel: for example, it can log file opens, system calls,
user logins, activity on filesystem paths, etc. When developing our kernel instrumentation we
investigated the possibility of leveraging the auditing subsystem to record which processes open
the input devices for reading, but later came to the conclusion that the capabilities of the auditing
platform were not quite what we needed. Though the audit system has most of these features,
we needed lightweight instrumentation which would process a particular set of system calls, and
of those system calls, only process the calls which were dealing with the input devices. For these
reasons we decided to create a kernel module.
Our second implementation route, the creation of a kernel module, works by intercepting a process’
invocations of the system calls. Kernel modules are blocks of code injected into the kernel and
provide additional functionality to the core of the kernel. The purpose of our kernel module is to
replace the open, read, and close system calls and record applications which invoke those calls
on the particular file paths relating to the input devices. When our code is injected into the kernel
it performs three initialization tasks:
1. Searches for the existing system call definitions residing in the kernel.
2. Disables read-only memory and replaces the definitions for open, read, and close and inserts
copies of those definitions pointing to the implementations within our kernel module.
3. Re-enables read only memory and beings accepting invocations of our open, read, and close
copies.
Each of the copied system calls within our module are short functions, they simply record the
necessary information, and then invoke the kernel’s original copy. This allows us to maintain full
compatibility with every process running within the kernel, but also perform arbitrary logging. We
modified the /etc/modules file to ensure that our kernel module is automatically started during
the boot process.
4.2.1 Open, Read, Close
To extract the appropriate information from the system call invocations, we discuss each system
call in turn and data recorded.
The open system call has three parameters: the file path to be opened, if the file should be opened
for read or writing, and if a new file- the permissions the file should be created with. The system
call returns a unique-to-process “file descriptor” which can be used in future system calls to work
with the opened file. We compare the file path parameter to two file paths known for holding input
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devices: /dev/tty and /dev/input. If the parameter does not start with either of those two paths
we simply ignore the invocation and allow it to proceed as normal. If the path is for an input
device, then we record the full file path, the process’ unique identifier, the name of the executable,
and the returned file descriptor. Further, we maintain a small data structure, which we will refer
to as “openInputs”, to track which process and file descriptor are associated with an opened input
device. We output our logged data to the kernel log using the kernel’s printk function and let the
existing system infrastructure save it to disk.
The read system call has three parameters: the file descriptor (as provided by the return of the
open syscall), the location in application memory space where the read should save data, and the
maximum number of bytes the requesting application wishes to receive. In our approach, we only
process the syscall if there is an existing entry in our openInputs data structure which matches
the process and file descriptor provided in the read system call’s parameters. If there is a match,
we log the requesting process’ unique identifier, the associated file descriptor, and the number of
bytes read. In doing so, we are able to record exactly the number of bytes read by the application
from the input devices. As with the read system call, we perform our logging to disk via the
kernel’s printk infrastructure.
The third and final call we intercept is the close system call. It accepts just a single input
parameter: the file descriptor (as provided by the return of the open syscall) to close. Our
approach only logs a process’ invocation of this system call when there exists and entry in our
openInputs data structure which match the requesting process’ unique identifier and associated
file descriptor. When this happens, we simply log that the application has ended its read of the
input device and we remove the appropriate entry from our openInputs structure.
4.3 Evaluation
In order to evaluate our implementation of the kernel sensor, we inspect both the performance
overhead of the approach, and the efficacy of the logging. We perform a test with manual use
of the keyboard and mouse, and an inspection of the results to verify the expected processes are
captured.
4.3.1 Performance
Since our instrumentation is operating within the kernel, a heavily optimized and time-critical
portion of the system, our approach needs to log data quickly. This becomes especially important
as the particular system calls our module intercepts are very frequently used during the use of an
end-host. We performed two tests on a Ubuntu Desktop 14.04 virtual machine with four 2.6GHz
cores and 2GB of RAM to verify our performance is within acceptable bounds. First, we test how
long it takes for our instrumentation to execute when a process opens, reads, or closes a file path
dealing with an input device. We show these results in Table 1. Secondly, we test our performance
cost when we intercept a system call invocation which does not deal with an input device and
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Table 1: Overhead time in µs when processing an open, read, or close system call handling input
from user input-devices as seen through 28,265 data points. 18 zero entries, and 105 large data
points excluded.
Minimum Median Average 95th Percentile Maximum Standard Deviation
0.024 0.643 0.680 1.317 3.983 0.347
Table 2: Overhead time in µs to determine an invocation of an open, read, or close system call
is not dealing with user input as seen through 42,872,901 data points. We excluded 304,236 (0.7%
of total) ‘0’ entries and 15,875 entries for being greater than two times the median.
Minimum 1st Percentile Median Average 99th Percentile Maximum Std. Dev.
0.001 0.231 0.387 0.377 1.052 4.949 0.193
therefore does not require further processing. These results can be found in Table 2. To capture
the real, or wall-clock time, our code takes to complete, we use the kernel’s getnstimeofday before
and after our code executes, then log the calculated difference.
When displaying our performance results we remove data points which claimed to take no time
(“0”), and data points which were over two times the standard deviation greater than the mean.
We attribute the results which indicated a “0” overhead due to faults, or insufficient resolution, in
the kernel’s getnstimeofday as a “0” would indicate the unlikely result that the kernel completed
the entire task within three clock cycles. We attribute the large and comparatively very slow
results, to operating system scheduling quirks (e.g. another process executed which paused our
code) rather than delays in our kernel module.
We can see in Tables 1 and 2 that our approach has extremely small overhead when handling
events passing through our kernel module. When either deciding that a system call needs to be
logged or determining that it does not we are able to pass control back to the normal kernel process
within, on average, a few hundred nanoseconds. Even with system calls being invoked frequently,
our logging of the appropriate information to determine which processes are reading from the input
devices causes imperceptible delays for the user.
4.3.2 Efficacy of Monitoring
To determine if our method of instrumentation and selective data logging were effective in iden-
tifying the processes which read input devices, we performed two verification tests. Our first
test shows we are properly recording incoming input proportional to the input created. Our sec-
ond test verified that we were properly detecting applications which were reading from the input
devices.
We ran our first test by powering up a Linux Ubuntu Desktop 14.04 instance, letting it boot to
the login screen, and performing two simple sets of actions. First, we simply moved the mouse
around for an increasing amount of time. Second, we type arbitrary keys on the keyboard at the
rate of one key press every second. We capture results every twenty seconds over the course of a
minute and a half. We represent our results tabularly in Table 3.
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Table 3: Results of moving the mouse around and pressing a single keyboard key every second.
Results taken every twenty seconds over the course of nearly two minutes. Our kernel sensor
accurately reports the increase in bytes read over time.
Number of Bytes Read from Device
Device Start 20 Seconds 40 Seconds 60 seconds 80 seconds
Mouse 23 1734 3951 6388 8631
Keyboard 29 67 107 146 186
Our results indicate that we not only successfully capture the input data read from the input
devices, we also record results proportional to the amount of data received even across multiple
read system calls. In Table 3 we notice an approximately linear increase for the capture of mouse
movements for eighty seconds during which time we were constantly moving the mouse around
the screen. Despite this trend, we notice less events when moving the cursor slowly compared to
moving the cursor at a rapid pace. This leads us to believe that the mouse reports movements are
mainly reported at a set frequency, though the frequency can increase for rapid movement. We
note that all testing was done with an virtualized absolute pointing device powered by qemu [33],
and other mice might report movement differently. Similar to the mouse, our results also show
an approximately linear increase for the capture of keyboard events. As opposed to the mouse
however, a linear trend is expected for the keyboard. This due to how the keyboard state is
maintained: either a key is pressed, or it is not. By pressing a single key approximately every
second we record the information regarding the change of state to reflect the press of the key, then
another change when the key is release. Accordingly, we notice two events for each keystroke in a
linear trend following the number of keystrokes.
After rebooting the Ubuntu instance, we performed our second test focused on the effectiveness
of our ability to capture which processes read from the input devices. We waited for the Ubuntu
display manager (the login window) to start, then over an SSH connection we ran the command
‘sudo cat /dev/device/mice > /dev/null’. This command will open the mouse device, read
all input from the device, then discard the output (bytes written to /dev/null simply get dropped
by the kernel). Under these conditions we expect to see two applications receiving input from
the mouse: the X.Org Window System (powering the login window), and our own cat process.
We proceed to move the mouse around and click a few times before finishing the test. We then
repeated the process but used the following command to read input from the keyboard instead of
the mouse: ‘sudo cat /dev/device/input0 > /dev/null’. We pressed and released a number
of keys on the keyboard, then ended the test. We inspected our log file, noted the programs which
opened the input devices and calculated the sum of bytes each program read.
We first inspect which programs opened the input devices. Interestingly we observed a number
of programs opening and reading from /dev/tty. According to the Linux documentation, the
/dev/tty alternative tty device is the ‘current’ tty associated with the process running [34]. As
these are not connected to the user-input devices, we ignore the entries in our logs referring to
/dev/tty device. In in the abbreviated log entry below, we can see how our kernel sensor logged
the input devices being opened by processes:
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pid:3922 fd:3 exe:sh file:/dev/tty7
pid:3961 fd:7 exe:X file:/dev/tty7
pid:3961 fd:10 exe:X file:/dev/input/mice
pid:3961 fd:10 exe:X file:/dev/input/mice
pid:3961 fd:10 exe:X file:/dev/input/mice
pid:3956 fd:3 exe:sh file:/dev/tty7
pid:4971 fd:3 exe:cat file:/dev/input/mice
pid:4976 fd:3 exe:cat file:/dev/tty7
We then are able to inspect our logs for the amount of data each of these devices read. Below is
an except from our kernel log as an example for how we record process’ reads:
read pid:4971 fd:3 bytes:3
read pid:3961 fd:10 bytes:4
[ ... ]
pid:3961 fd:7 bytes:2
[ ... ]
pid:4976 fd:3 bytes:2
As can be seen in Table 4, not every application which opens our input devices actually read input.
We can see this in the two cases of the shell program sh opening, but never reading, the input
devices. On the other hand, we see that the program X read both from the keyboard and the
mouse. We also see that out experimental reads using the program cat appear in our results as
well. As an interesting side effect of our tests, we can see that our cat program received more
data than the program X. This a functionality of the /dev/tty7 device. It only allows for a single
program to read input from it at a time; before our test, X was receiving keyboard input, during
our test only our cat program received input, and at the end of our test X began receiving all the
input again.
Through the use of our kernel sensor we are able to extract and log which applications read from the
input devices. However, the data mainly indicates that there is a single large consumer of keyboard
and mouse data, the program X. On Linux systems, instead of each program receiving user-input
directly from the kernel, all the input data is sent to the X.Org’s X Window System [7]. As the
X.Org X Window System is responsible for creating the graphical user interface and managing
which processes appear on the screen, it consumes all of the user input and dispatches it to the
correct recipient makes sense. To detect which processes actually receive the user input, we place
instrumentation within the X Window System.
5 Second Sensor: X11
The second sensor of our approach is embedded in the code of X.Org’s X Window Server (X11),
a widely used windowing system for Linux platforms [7]. On mainstream Linux distributions X11
is installed and tasked with handling the display of windows, managing the mouse and keyboard,
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Table 4: Input-device data read by each process as recorded by the kernel sensor.
Program PID Mouse Reads Keyboard Reads Total Reads
sh 3922 0 0 0
X 3961 2464 86 2550
sh 3956 0 0 0
cat 4971 2170 0 2170
cat 4976 0 120 120
and working across many types of hardware. X11 is particularly useful for our approach because
it is in the middle of the interaction between an end-user and the applications displayed on the
screen. Additionally, since X11 is an open-source project, our approach is able to freely review
and instrument the appropriate code to make our sensor work.
On our chosen implementation platform, Ubuntu Desktop, X11 is owned and executed under root
permissions. As such, we place our X11 instrumentation within our trusted computing base when
we exclude root-level compromises. Despite this, our instrumentation does provide some quantita-
tive metrics (keyboard presses, mouse movements) which can be correlated with our kernel sensor
to enhance trust. Additionally, while our approach instruments X11 in a way which allows the
partial logging of remotely connected applications, we assume that all clients of the X windowing
server are applications running on localhost (e.g., we exclude X11 session tunneling).
Through our X11 sensor we are able to extract the processes that are connected to the X11
Server, and of those processes, which ones received input from the user. We do so by tracking
which on-screen windows each client application creates and then logging which window receives
an input event. Furthermore, we are able to detect if a process’ window is fully viewable on the
screen, partially viewable, or completely obscured when receiving an event. Associating which
window, fully visible or not, receives user input is critical for the accurate attribution of which
process received input. For example, a user can scroll up, down, and trigger mouse-over events on
background windows. Our sensor also keeps track of how frequently an application sends an update
to its on-screen windows: by using this information we are able to quantify the amount of output
a process shows to the user. In combining both of our quantitative metrics in describing both the
user input and process output, we can classify progress as either “input-heavy,” “output-heavy,”
or “balanced.”
5.1 Approach
Through the kernel sensor we are able to detect which processes open and read from the input
devices, but in default deployments the X Window Server is the only consumer of such input. In
order to continue following the chain from the user to the process, we instrument X11 to indicate
which processes are registered with, and listening for events from, X11. We now discuss the current
state of the graphics processing chain on our chosen environment, describe the purpose of X11,
and how our sensor works.
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The kernel provides a layer of abstraction between the display hardware and processes wishing
to utilize the display. In Linux, a framebuffer is the layer of abstraction for the screen. As with
any device abstracted by the Linux kernel, the framebuffer can be thought of as a file located at
/dev/fb0 and interacted with using the standard file system calls read, and write. In essence, it
is a region in memory where an application can write the color values of individual pixels and then
expect the kernel to perform the appropriate manipulations for the data to appear on the screen in
front of the user. It is worth noting though that the use of the kernel framebuffer is not required;
in fact, newer graphics hardware will expose their own framebuffer equivalent for applications to
interact with.
5.1.1 The X Server
While the framebuffer is nice abstraction by the kernel, the framebuffer gives any single application
access to the entirety of a display. This can be useful in cases when a process (or the kernel)
wishes to display “full-screen” applications (e.g., the system-owned virtual terminals). However,
this becomes problematic if you want to run multiple applications on the same screen. If two
processes open the framebuffer and attempt to write their own application window, corrupted
data will be printed to the screen as each process fights for the same space. To solve this issue
a third process is required. This third process must be capable of receiving graphical commands
from each application and multiplexing them correctly onto the framebuffer. This lead to the
development of X11.
The X Window Server created by the developers of X.Org is an open-source implementation of
the X Window Server specification. Commonly referred to as X11, it creates layer of abstraction
between the framebuffer provided by the Linux kernel and applications wishing to have a screen
presence. The X server simply creates a screen of resolution equal to that of the kernel framebuffer
and accepts requests for drawing to the screen from client processes. At a basic level, to render
application windows on screen, applications must interact with the X server or risk colliding on
writes to the framebuffer. Furthermore, any application wishing to write to the framebuffer must
have root-level permissions.
In order to facilitate any number of possible applications requiring the screen to be multiplexed,
X11 works under the Client-Server model. Th “XServer” component controls some number of
displays on the host in which it is running. The server is able to accept connections from clients
who implement the X11 protocol; typically (for security reasons) these connections are only allowed
from localhost over unix networking sockets. Any number of clients can connect to the XServer
using an Application Programming Interface (API) exposed by X11. This API, commonly referred
to as “Xlib,” contains the information and methods required to speak the X protocol with XServers.
Furthermore, this API contains abstractions such as a ‘window’ to simplify a process’ requirements
to draw to the screen instead of requiring them to manage the raw pixel information that would
accompany writing directly to the framebuffer. Applications wishing to display something on the
screen may use Xlib to create a connection to the XServer. Once the connection is formed we refer
to the client process as an XClient.
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5.1.2 Window Managers
X11 was designed under the mentality that a Windowing System should do no more than is
strictly necessary to provide just the windowing features. This lead to the design of X being
somewhat minimalistic, but with the support for an empowered XClient to dictate how it wanted
all windows to appear. For example, there is the standard desktop-emulating windowing approach
where individual windows can be overlapped partially or even fully, just like you could with papers
on a desk. Alternatively, X11 can also power a windowing approach where all windows are snapped
to specific locations and sizes without any overlap. These alternative windowing approaches are
preferred by some users for a more efficient work environment. As an example, Microsoft Windows
7 has a sense of this with it’s snap-window-to-edge feature “Snap” [35].
In order to support this wide range of windowing mentalities, X allows for a single XClient to
connect and request special window management features. These special permissions allow for
certain types of control over all windows being displayed. XClients which invoke these permissions
are referred to as Window Managers. Window Managers come in many different forms, but for our
approach with Ubuntu Linux, compiz is the default installed window manager [36]. On Ubuntu,
compiz is responsible for adding the standardized window decoration and provides control over the
relocation of windows across the display (typically by drag-dropping the title bar of the window).
The Window Managers are also able to reparent the root window, meaning they can place their
own window as the top-most window on the desktop and influence all other windows on the screen.
However, the main dispatching and handling of client actions are still routed through the core of
X11 and thus our approach does need not need to instrument the window manager as well.
5.1.3 Display Managers and Launching X
In addition to the Window Manager, most distributions will also come packaged with a Display
Manager. Launched right after the kernel boot process finishes, the Display Manager is responsible
for displaying a graphical user interface (GUI) for the end-user to authenticate with (typically
referred to as the login screen). This GUI replaces the standard text-based console login that
would otherwise be present. The display manager starts an XServer instance, and communicates
with it in order to display the login greeter and authenticate the user over the special X Display
Manager Control Protocol [37]. Once a user is authenticated, the display manager will start a
new XServer instance to handle the display of the user’s desktop and applications the user wishes
to run. On our chosen implementation platform, Ubuntu 14.04, the default display manager is
lightdm [38].
5.1.4 Placing Windows on the Screen
An application must go through a number of steps in order to display a window on the screen
through the XServer. To aid in understanding how the system works, we will discuss the method
used by an application to display a window on the screen and how such a process factors into our
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instrumentation approach. First an application includes the Xlib header file, which provides all
the functions to interact with the XServer. The application then opens a connection to the display
and prepares to create a drawable object. In the world of the X Window System, a drawable is
one of two objects: either a pixmap, or a window. Both are objects which can receive any of the
commands which create a displayable visual; for example, the application can instruct the XServer
to create a line on a specified drawable.
While both drawable objects, the main difference between a pixmap and a window is that only a
window is actually displayable on the screen. Typically, an application will create a pixmap for
off-screen generation of what it wishes to be displayed, then instruct the XServer to simply copy
the completed contents of a pixmap over to a window to be displayed on the screen. This provides
a number of benefits to the application; for example the application can hide any intermediary
alterations to the window and only provide a completed update when it is available. This use of
the pixmap is a common approach to reduce flickering or tearing in user-visible windows and often
referred to as ‘double-buffering.’
With a newly allocated window, the process next needs to listen for events on the newly allocated
window from the XServer. Usually this is done by the client requesting notifications for only the
events it cares about. These include an “Expose” event in which the process is told that the
window has become at least partially exposed to the user. When an XClient, and by extension the
window, registers to accept an Expose event, it can react to such an event by telling the XServer
to, for example, copy a portion of it’s off-screen pixmap into the now visible part of the on-screen
window. Finally, to place the allocated window on the display, the process indicates to the XServer
that the window should be mapped to a particular display. Once this final step is performed the
window will be viewable by the user.
In order to track and quantitatively reason about a process’ screen presence, our approach in-
struments the key portions of this process. In particular, we focus on the XServer’s processes for
handling the creations of windows and copying of drawables.
5.1.5 Listening for User Input
Similar to listening for Expose events, applications can also indicate to the XServer that they wish
to be notified of user input events. The X Window Server supports a wide range of input types,
ranging from the standard keyboard and mouse all the way to touch screens and tablets. For the
purposes of our approach, we restrict our focus simply to the keyboard and mouse. In order to
request input notifications, the client application must set an event mask on windows it has access
to. This informs the XServer that on that particular window the process has requested notification
of user input. This means a process which has registered to receive input from the keyboard and
mouse will only be passed the information if the particular keyboard press or mouse movement
occurs within the specific window the process has registered on.
Since an application can only receive input events on a window it has registered on, we are able to
track which applications receive input from the user by watching the flow of events. For instance,
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if we see that a particular XClient has received thirty-four keyboard press notifications, we know
that the process associated with that client connection has been notified of user input. On a larger
scale, by logging all delivered events relating to user input, we are able to indicate which processes
received which types of events, how frequently, and indicate the quantity of events each process
received.
To perform the instrumentation necessary to both quantitatively record an application’s display
output and user input, we target the XServer code responsible for handling the dispatching of
application requests, and the delivery of events.
5.2 Implementation
We explored the ability to instrument the X11 source code on the Ubuntu Linux distribution,
release 14.04. We chose this particular release of Ubuntu because it is on Ubuntu’s long term
support schedule. This means that the engineering we perform in determining the viability of
our X11 instrumentation will be usable for the duration of the support cycle (approximately five
years) [39]. Ubuntu’s 14.04 release comes packaged with a slightly altered X Windows Server based
off of version 1.15.1 as minor alterations are performed by Ubuntu developers to backport security
updates. In an attempt to use the same version packaged by Ubuntu, we downloaded the source
code which the maintainers of Ubuntu use when compiling the binary package shipped with the
release. However due to compilation errors and other miscellaneous issues, we instead opted to
download the latest source straight from the maintainers of the X.Org X Windowing System, the
X.Org foundation [7].
Our checkout of the latest X Windowing Server source code provided us with a stable, but
in-progress version based on the 1.17.1 release. To perform the automated checkout and
build process, we employed a shell script provided by the Xorg Foundation [40]. While
our version is two releases ahead of the version packaged with the Ubuntu 14.04 distribu-
tion, there were no issues compiling and running the software. After building the X Window
Server portion of the project, we installed the new binaries to a custom prefix to leave the
original Ubuntu-packaged installation untouched. We altered the lightdm configuration file,
/usr/share/lightdm/lightdm.conf.d/50-xserver-command.conf, to boot our custom com-
piled XServer instead of the original one. With this setup we were able to rapidly prototype
our alterations to the code and test them on a virtual machine.
5.2.1 Capturing Graphical Output
In order to track and quantitatively describe the graphical output of processes, we reviewed the
XServer codebase. As all XClients need to communicate the desired window alterations to the
XServer, we focused on instrumenting the code handling this client-server conversation. Within
the xserver/dix/dispatch.c source file we located and placed logging hooks within the function
appropriately named Dispatch. This XServer function is responsible for looping over all open
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file descriptors and appropriately handling any incoming data. As requests come in from clients,
they are dispatched accordingly using a table of functions pointers. The table of function pointers
holds the mapping between the X protocol’s request numbers and the correct function to be
executed.
We identified a number of request handling functions potentially useful for our approach. The list is
as follows: CreateWindow, CopyArea, DestoryWindow, PolyFillArc, PolyFillRectangle, PolyLine,
PolyPoint, PolyRectangle, PolySegment, PolyText, PutImage. After some inspection, we decided
that it was not needed to embed instrumentation in all of those functions. Instead, we identified the
following three functions as frequently used and good enough to provide the data we needed:
• CreateWindow: Create a drawable Window of the specified dimensions and properties.
• CopyArea: Copies the contents of one drawable to another.
• PolyLine: Creates a single line from point ‘a’ to point ‘b’
We chose these particular requests because they covered a reasonable subset of the possible options
and would allow us to determine whether or not the thematically-related requests were used at
all. We determined after a quick informal test that, as expected, CreateWindow is used frequently.
There were many calls to CopyArea moving display data from pixmaps into windows and there
were no requests for PolyLine. We attribute the high use of CopyArea to the use of user-space
graphical libraries which take care of constructing and rendering the graphics to a pixmap on the
XServer. When the application is ready, it sends a request to the XServer indicating the drawn
frame should be copied from the pixmap to some on-screen window.
For those windows displayed on the screen, there will be some windows which are actually visible,
some windows which are covered, and others which are completely covered by other windows. In
our approach, we seek to separate these fully visible windows from those which are not. Even if a
process has some screen presence, if the screen presence is always covered by some other window,
then we want to be able to represent that. To do so, we leverage the window attributes maintained
by the XServer. For every window allocated by a client, the XServer creates a new Window struct.
This struct contains everything the server needs to know about a window. For our purposes we
are particularly interested in the visibility, drawable-width, and drawable-height fields.
By processing these three attributes about a window, our approach is empowered with the ability
to differentiate between processes which actually have a screen presence and those which simply
have sent a few commands to the XServer. The drawable-height and drawable-width fields record,
as an integer, the height and width of the window in pixels. The visibility field consists of four
possible values representing the current visibility state of the window.
1. The window is completely unobscured i.e. the window is fully shown to the user.
2. The window is partially obscured, perhaps just by a few pixels, or perhaps nearly all covered.
We leave the computation of exactly “how much” of a window is visible to future work. In
our approach we simply note if a window was visible at all.
3. The window is totally obscured and not visible to the user.
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4. The window is not viewable.
This last state is usually caused by a client creating a window but not completing the process to
“map” and cause a window to be a candidate for display on the screen.
When our X11 sensor is triggered from the three functions in which we embedded instrumentation,
we record the current state of the window in question, the window’s width and height, the window’s
unique identifier, and the unique identifier for the client connection. Through the aggregation of
these log entires, we are able to determine which processes sent data to the screen for display and
which processes did not.
5.2.2 Capturing User Input
On the reverse path, tracking user input to processes, our approach focused on a different source
file in the XServer code. As discussed previously, we know that processes are required to “register”
or set event masks in the windows they manage if they wish to accept events, such as user-input,
on those windows. Our approach was to track backward from the code within the XServer which
delivered the events to the window’s clients up to the point where it was computed which events
were desired by which clients. In other words, we located the portion of XServer code which
compared all generated events on a window to the list of event-masks and determined which events
were dropped (i.e. no one wished to receive the event) or which events were to be transmitted
down to the window’s clients. We note while the XServer code does indicate a window can have
multiple clients, we never saw this practice occur; for simplicity we assume that a window has only
a single client.
If an event is determined to be desired by a process, we aim to capture and log the events shown in
the list below. For some logically-equivalent event types, there are multiple versions of the event
(e.g., DeviceKeyPress and KeyPress). While both these events convey the same information, they
have different sources in the XServer code and therefore are named separately. In the list below
we show these events with a similar meaning as a single group.
• DeviceKeyPress, KeyPress: This event occurs when a keyboard indicates that a key has
been pressed down. We log the which key on the keyboard was pressed.
• DeviceKeyRelease, KeyRelease: This event occurs when a keyboard indicates that a
previously pressed key has been released. We log which key on the keyboard was released.
• ButtonPress: This event occurs when the mouse indicates that a button has been pressed.
The button could be the left, middle, or right mouse buttons.
• ButtonRelease: This event occurs when the mouse indicates that a previously pressed
button has been released.
• MotionNotify: This event occurs when the mouse indicates motion.
• GenericEvent: This event occurs when the event was generated by an X11 extension.
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Using these events generated and delivered by the XServer, we are able to quantitatively indicate
the amount of user input a particular window receives. By extension, we obtain the amount of input
a process receives. In particular, we log two events for each keyboard and mouse button inputs as
both KeyPress and ButtonPress events have their corresponding KeyRelease and ButtonRelease
events. Further, the MotionNotify event is triggered frequently and appears to be bounded by
time intervals, not by the rate or distance the mouse traveled. We log each event and determine
amount of mouse movement within a window by the number of MotionNotify events the window
receives.
We track the GenericEvent type due to a particular X11 extension which is sometimes involved
in handling the user input. The Xi extension is an attempt to increase the types of input devices
the XServer can handle [41]. For example, it provides support for the keyboard, mouse, trackpad,
touchscreen, tablet, and even multitouch devices. While we assume just the standard keyboard
and mouse are present, our approach made a concerted effort to capture the events from this
extension because it can occasionally be used to deliver keyboard and mouse events under certain
process conditions, such as when the user is at the login screen. In our implementation, we are
able to simply recognize the Xi input identifier, and then apply our existing code to determine if
the contained event is a KeyPress, KeyRelease, etc.
In all, we log the event type, the unique window identifier, whether or not the window is visible,
and the file descriptor for the client connection receive the input. If the event is for a KeyPress
or KeyRelease, we also log the particular key-code (name of the key) which was pressed/release
on the keyboard. Future approaches could leverage this data to track the movement of sensitive
keywords or even passwords and identify when such data traveled to programs which should not
have received it.
5.2.3 Correlating PIDs with Windows
A major portion of our instrumentation relies on the ability to take a Client struct, representing
an XClient to the XServer and output the associated process. Determining which process cor-
responds to which XClient is not a simple task and requires some extra engineering. The X11
client-server protocol was written under the assumption that the XServer and XClient may not
be on the same physical host, and as such, maintaining state on a processes’ unique-to-system
identifier (PID) holds no meaning. For example, there is no way to know the PID of the process
if the XClient is on a remote machine. However, since our approach assumes all XServers and
XClients are hosted on the same physical machine, knowing the PID of the XClient is not only
useful, it is vital to knowing which process is interacting with the user.
In a general move towards tracking the process identifier of connected XClients, X11 develop-
ers added in a new window property: NET WM PID. This property is a newer addition to the X
Window System and works in conjunction with WM CLIENT MACHINE. The general idea is that if
WM CLIENT MACHINE is set to the host’s own hostname, then the NET VM PID is the pid of the
process running on the host. If the hostname does not match the host’s own name, then the PID is
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representing the process identifier on some remote host, and is not helpful. Since in our approach
we assume all XClients and XServers are on the same host, we can always get useful meaning out
of the NET VM PID property. However, the property must be set by the XClient process itself. If
the process either does not support it, or decides to give a false PID value, the XServer will not be
able to tell the true value. Therefore our approach needed a different method to obtain the true
PID of the XClient.
To reliably detect which process is responsible for initiating an XClient session, we focus on the
mechanism of communication. When on the same host, the connection between the XServer
and XClient occur over UNIX sockets. Just like normal Internet-style sockets, the UNIX sockets
are simply a connection between two processes. Our approach is to retrieve the details of this
connection from the XServer and follow the connection back to the originating process. In order
to do so, we retrieve the file descriptor for the XServer’s side of the socket from the Client data
structure.
Gathering information regarding sockets and their connections requires assistance from the kernel.
To gain this information, we first retrieve the system-wide unique identifier for the UNIX socket
associated with the particular XServer-XClient communication channel we have targeted. To do
so, we simply perform a read link system call on the file path /proc/self/fd/##. This utilizes
the kernel’s pseudo-filesystem “proc”, to tell us information about the current process “self” (X11),
with respect to the file descriptor “##” (obtained from the Client struct). When reading this
pseudo-link we are returned the unique UNIX socket identifier. With this in hand, we can then use
the existing socket tool ss to query the kernel and extract the connection information relating to the
specific UNIX socket in hand [42]. With this data returned, our instrumentation will have reversed
the socket connection and learned of the true process responsible for the client connection.
Unfortunately, performing the computation to connect a client with its process takes enough time to
introduce noticeable slow downs in the user interface. To overcome this, we place instrumentation
in the key location to perform the computation a single time: immediately after the XServer
establishes the client connection. By placing the instrumentation within that block code we can
be sure that there will not be an event or request handled by the XServer without first ensuring
we know which process is connected as the XClient. Furthermore, we are able to detect when a
client disconnects from the server and appropriately log the recycling of file descriptor to retain
our log integrity.
5.2.4 Creation of the Logging Infrastructure
To augment the instrumentation of the XServer, we added a logging mechanism to the code of
the XServer. Our mechanism was designed to take all of the logging data we create and save it
to a single file on the disk for later processing. We designed our logging functions to be similar
to the printf function in that our functions are able to consume an arbitrary number of typed
parameters. After some processing of the logged data, such as adding a timestamp and performance
data, we leverage the existing vfprintf function to save the logged data to an open file descriptor.
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We implemented full pthread-based mutexes to protect our log file from race conditions which
could corrupt our saved data.
5.3 Results and Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our X11 sensor through two methods. First, we review the perfor-
mance cost of our instrumentation and discuss the effects, if any, such overhead has on the user’s
experience. Second, we determine how well the sensor is able to extract meaningful interaction
data from the Xserver. In particular, we show our instrumentation is sufficient to tell the difference
between processes with no user interaction and processes which had some interaction.
5.3.1 Performance
Since our X11 sensor is in the cornerstone of the user interface, our performance is critical to the
overall speed of the GUI. This can become problematic if, for example, our sensor causes any undue
delays while extracting the interaction information from the data flowing through the XServer as
it will be directly observable by the user. To aid in expediting our processing we leveraged a few
mechanisms for efficiency: stateless data extraction, buffered data logging to disk, and minimizing
duplicated work. In doing so, we push the majority of the analytic computation to either a separate
process reading our log in real-time, or to post-processing work. To measure our overhead when
extracting data from the XServer, we include a performance metric within each entry of information
we log. Utilizing programming libraries included with Ubuntu we invoke gettimeofday to obtain
a microsecond resolution timestamp immediately when our data extraction begins, and then again
immediately after the extraction has completed. We compute the difference in ‘wall-clock’ time and
then include this difference at the end of our log entry as it is buffered for output to disk.
We collected performance results by running a test in which we exercised a number of applications
while using our instrumented version of the XServer. After collecting the performance data, we
first removed 73 entries within our performance logs which indicated that our instrumentation took
no time; these ‘0’ entries we attribute to the system time libraries not having sufficient resolution
to accurate measure the elapsed time. Second, we removed any entries which were determined
to be over two times the standard deviation greater than the mean. These numbers we attribute
to operating system scheduling factors causing our instrumentation to wait while other processes
completed. In all, we only removed 2,515 entries, or 0.17% of the data points. After the removal
of these outliers a summary of our performance results can be seen in Table 5. Through our
performance analysis we conclude that, on average, our X11 instrumentation takes approximately
20 microseconds to complete. We believe such a low performance overhead will cause no delays or
other issues with rapidly processing user commands to update the interface.
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Table 5: Overhead time for each logged user-event and process-request in µs as seen through
1,516,861 data points. 73 zero entires and 2,442 entries excluded from the statistics for being two
times the standard deviation greater than the original mean.
Minimum 5th Percentile Median Average 95th Percentile Maximum Std. Dev.
1 3 7 19.46 33 988 57.16
5.3.2 Efficacy
We next tested how well our X11 sensor was able to detect the processes with which the user
interacted. In order to test this, we conducted a controlled experiment where we opened a set of
applications, used them for their intended purpose, then closed them. Based upon the intended
purpose, we would expect to see certain behaviors. For example, the text-editor gedit we expect
to accept a large amount of input from the user while typing or revising a document. On the
other hand, we would expect a video player such as vlc to have a high level of output to display
a video and little user-input as a user need only click play. By analyzing our X11 sensor’s log
data we obtained the results below; we indicate the name of the client process, the process’ unique
identifier, the quantity of display output, and the quantity of input delivered (separated by input
from the keyboard and input from the mouse). We abbreviate the list by specifying applications
with no more than 20 output events, and no input events should be ignored.
Client PID Output Keyboard Mouse
"chromium-browse" 12703 5769 0 1382
"vlc" 12127 231 0 0
"vlc" 12127 1034 0 0
"vlc" 12127 5780 0 0
"gedit" 12060 3892 4031 137
"nautilus" 11520 1050 4 477
"compiz" 11472 42568 0 1
"bamfdaemon" 10746 2 99 156
"unity-greeter" 10042 64 54 4
In the initial our of testing our prototype we began to see trends forming in the relationships
between categories of applications and the amount of user interface input/output they performed.
As with any such behavior-based categorization, our classification of processes into groups of
interaction types is heavily influenced by the user and their particular usage patterns. For example,
editing a document in the Google Documents suite will make chromium-browser appear with
relatively more input events compared to watching a series of YouTube videos. Despite this
possibility, we were able to take advantage of repeating trends to create the following classification.
We first group “no-interaction” processes by simply listing the processes running on a host and
identifying those processes not on the above list. Second, we group programs which are “output-
heavy” as processes which have a more than four times the number output events than input
events. Third, we group processes which are “balanced” as processes which have between one-
third and one-half the amount of input events as output events. Finally, we group processes
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which are “input-heavy” as those which have at least half of the number of input events as output
events.
Based upon our categorization we can reason about the results we received from the X11 sensor.
For example, we can make the statement that in our trial chromium-browser is considered an
output-heavy application with 24% of its output events being matched with input events, but
that it is close to being balanced. This makes sense given the general purpose of the web-browser
is to accept some amount of user-input, then display web-pages, videos, and images back to the
user. On the other hand we observe the gedit program, which received more input events than
outputs events, making it a clear input-heavy process. We can further extend our categorization to
processes which are built for handling the graphical interface itself. For example, unity-greeter
is a process for handling the display of the login-window to users. Intuitively, we reason that
the login-window is at least a “balanced” process given that it must display items on screen and
accept authentication credentials from the user. However, the login-window is relatively output
static and mainly just accepts many input characters (i.e., a password). This matches with the
“input-heavy” result we observe in our test results.
Through testing both the performance and efficacy of the X11 sensor, we have shown our imple-
mentation to be effective. Our extraction of data is efficient and quick, preventing the user from
even recognizing that the logging is taking place. We further show that our sensor is not only
able to accurately record user-interactions which processes, it also provides data allowing further
reasoning about how a user interacts with the process.
6 Third Sensor: GTK
With the kernel and X11 sensors, we are able to quantitatively track input stemming from the
input devices and also know to which process the events are delivered. However, these sensors
have no visibility into the process itself nor an understanding of what the user is seeing. As X11
mainly deals with rendered images, it is of no use to understand the context which caused the user
to enter an input, or the output which the application generated for the user to see. To gain this
insight, we look to the graphics libraries. Most contemporary applications are built upon graphical
libraries which are able to handle the details of generating objects, windows, and handling events
when creating a graphical user interface. Of the many libraries available, the most commonly used
one on the Ubuntu Linux distribution is the GIMP Toolkit, or GTK+ [8].
We focus on GTK+ and its ability to generate interfaces on the behalf of processes. When a
process utilizes GTK+’s public API to, for example, create a new window, the process can also in-
clude information like the window’s title or the window’s parent. We leverage this communication
between a process and GTK+ to capture text and relationship assignments. By placing instru-
mentation within the appropriate GTK+ API code we are able to extract contextual information
from an application by studying the object relationships and the text sent for display. With this
data in hand we are able to start reasoning about the actions a user performed within the graphical
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interface on an application and compare that to observed system actions.
In this section we review the GTK+ library and discuss our approach for instrumenting all of the
appropriate API calls to capture text and hierarchy information from processes. We show that we
are able to do so in an efficient way without any observable delays by the user.
6.1 Approach
Graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are designed specifically to be understood by the end user. Ap-
plications strive to create a graphical layout which will be intuitive, powerful, and used to quickly
complete tasks. We aim to leverage this design philosophy towards systematically extracting infor-
mation from displayed content and provide the data in a form possible for automated reasoning.
While the GUI usually employs many pictures and graphics to convey information, the interface is
still highly focused on text. Even applications which attempt to create an interface with a minimal
amount of visible text usually have tooltips or other explanations associated with their icons to
aid in a user’s understanding. In addition, applications typically employ common text phrases or
keywords to describe certain actions. In our approach, we take advantage of the GUI’s user-focused
design. We extract text and hierarchical information to provide context towards understand the
relationships between on-screen objects.
In Figure 2, we provide an example dialog modeled off of a common web browser’s print dialog.
When the user clicks on the print button, we can trigger a crawl over the elements on the dialog and
gain an understanding of the purpose of the dialog. We can inspect the text on the button itself,
review other buttons on the dialog, inspect the text on the dialog, and study how elements on the
dialog relate to each other. In doing so, we are able to create rich context describing the graphical
layout of the dialog. With rich context in hand, we are able to connect what a user interacted with
on the screen with behaviors of the system. In particular, we can compare logs of an application’s
system calls with the associated context that appeared on the screen. For example, if the context
shows a print dialog, we may expect a connection to a network printer.
Print
Total: 1 sheet of paper
Cancel Print
Destination Ricoh Printer
Change...
Pages All
Copies 1
Layout Portrait
Options Two-sided
More settings
Print using system dialog... 
Open PDF in Preview
+
+ -
Button
Activated
1422892756.014034
(2015-02-02 15:59:16)
Child Text: {Print}
Sibling Button Text: {Cancel, Change, +, -}
Parent Text: {Print}
Sibling Text: {Total:, 1, sheet of paper,
 Destination, Ricoh Printer,
 Pages, All, Copies, Layout,
 Portrait, Options, Two-sided,
 More settings,
 Print using system dialog...
 Open PDF in Preview}
Record Timestamp
Extract Context
Extract Process ID
2035
Temporarily Scrutinize Process
fork() new process 3824 0.000596s later
PID 3824 exec(/usr/bin/lpr) 0.000603s later
Possible Causal Link:
Clicking "Print" button may have
invoked "/usr/bin/lpr"
(lpr is used to submit print jobs)
Figure 2: We automatically extract contextual information surrounding user actions, such as
button clicks, and fuse it with low-level analysis to inform access control systems.
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To capture the text and context information we focus on instrumenting graphical libraries. Building
upon previous work [24,25] which attempted to process the rendered screen with optical character
recognition, we aim much earlier in the process. These graphic libraries create a layer of abstraction
between the gritty details of working with a windowing system (such as X) and the application
itself. An application can invoke the public application programming interface (API) of these
graphics libraries to quickly and simply create displayable and even user-controllable widgets such
as a window, button, or text box. As such, application developers have a strong incentive to utilize
these libraries: instead of focusing on the details of building a GUI from scratch, they can leave the
heavy lifting to a well prepared library. Our approach focuses on placing instrumentation within
key points of these graphical libraries in order to log requests from the application.
When testing the viability of our approach, we focus on the GTK+ graphics library running on
Ubuntu Linux. We chose GTK+ as it is one of the most popular graphics libraries available for
Linux and has support for Mac OS and Windows distributions as well [8]. While our future work
will delve into creating instrumentation for additional libraries, we note that our approach for
locating and logging the GTK+ public API invocations can be applied to all libraries, not just
GTK+.
Through the careful picking of which API calls we instrument, we can gain insight into the graphics
displayed on the screen with a minimal amount of overhead. For example, GTK+ has a number of
“set text”-style functions which are used to assign the text from a C-style array of characters to an
on-screen object. Additionally, GTK+ has API calls for setting an object’s parent and creating new
objects as children of other objects. As opposed to rendering functions, which need to be invoked
each time an object is moved, updated, or resized, these functions have a relatively low call rate.
The reasoning being, these “set text” and hierarchy calls are only required during the creation
of an object and afterwards only used if a text update is necessary. By placing instrumentation
within just these API calls, we are able to efficiently record both text and hierarchy information
without large overhead costs.
With instrumentation in place and extracted data in hand we are able to recreate the context of the
graphics displayed on the screen. By uniquely identifying objects through their recorded memory
address and timestamp, we can leverage the child-parent mappings to generate an object-relation
graph. Once the graph is created we are then able to use standard graph traversal methods such
as breadth-first search to further process the data and discover text and other objects sharing the
same parent. Combining these results with the process identification number (PID) we are able to
reconstruct which program the user interacted with and the context under which the interaction
took place. Leveraging the PID, we are then able to correlate interactions with other sensors and
even system calls the application perform to get a more complete picture of what the process was
doing.
We utilize the Linux Auditing Subsystem to record the system calls invoked by a particular process.
Using the auditing subsystem enables us to efficiently keep track of all actions an application
performs requiring greater permissions than is available just in user-space (such as connecting to
server or opening a file). The Linux Auditing Subsystem is a kernel feature originally developed
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for high-security compliance based activity audits [9]. It reports various types of events, including
the ability to report the list of systems calls an application uses. While our approach is based upon
reconstructing contextual information surrounding an event (like a button press), we will discuss
possible approaches to connecting our GUI logging infrastructure to the observed system behaviors.
This will foster an understanding of the user-based actions occurring on the system.
6.2 Implementation
To test the viability of our approach of instrumenting graphical libraries, we decided to use Ubuntu
Linux 12.10 platform running the default unity desktop environment. On the Ubuntu distribution,
there are two versions of GTK+ provided: GTK+2 and GTK+3. To provide maintain compati-
bility with existing applications and emulate an enterprise deployment we aimed to alter the same
versions of the libraries as was packaged with the system. Therefore we sought out and downloaded
the source code for GTK+ 2.24.16 and GTK+ 3.6.0 from the GTK website [8]. As a number of
long standing programs use the GTK+2 library, which runs an API incompatible with GTK+3, we
decided to instrument the basic functions in both GTK+2 and GTK+3 graphical libraries. How-
ever, to better support newer programs and fully test our approach, we further modified GTK+3
to capture more text flowing through the newer library. Once the instrumentation was in place, we
redirected all dynamically linked applications to use our custom compiled GTK+ libraries instead
of the system provided ones. Deployers could alter the /etc/ld.so.conf file to make this dynamic
linking change persistent across machine reboots.
When creating our instrumentation, we first focused on the GTK+ API functions which were
capable of manipulating text in widgets. To do so, we instrumented the sixteen highly used basic
functions listed below in both the GTK+2 and GTK+3 libraries.
gtk button set label
gtk cell view new with text
gtk clipboard set text
gtk editable insert text
gtk entry buffer set text
gtk entry set text
gtk label set text
gtk label set text with mnemonic
gtk menu item new with label
gtk menu item set label
gtk message dialog new
gtk message dialog new with markup
gtk real menu item set label
gtk text buffer insert
gtk text buffer insert interactive
gtk text buffer set text
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By launching various applications which relied on GTK+2 or GTK+3 we verified text extraction
was working as expected in both versions of the GTK+ library. While we observed that a significant
portion of on-screen text were recorded just by instrumenting these functions, we wanted to increase
our text coverage to all text passing through the library. To do so we developed a thorough and
systematic approach to identifying all of the API functions which manage text. We note that
while we only performed the extended instrumentation on GTK+3, the systematic approach we
developed would work equally well for completing the instrumentation on GTK+2 as well.
We began our systematic approach by reading over the GTK+3 documentation to identify traits
which all API functions manipulating text had in common. We noted that these functions would
accept either a standard C “char” or GTK typedef “gchar” as a parameter whenever the function
would be assigning text to a widget. Leveraging this pattern, we created a regular expression
capable of recognizing the text parameter and would automatically insert instrumentation code
for copying the text passing through the function call to our logging infrastructure. We executed
our regular expression based search over all of the GTK+3 header files with the understanding that
application developers would only be able to interact with the functions published in headers which
excluded static functions solely in the GTK+ source files from needing instrumentation.
Our search for text manipulation functions within the GTK+ header files returned 642 results. We
took this list and manually inspected each function returned, and if we reasoned that the discovered
function was indeed handling text and was reachable by a developed (i.e., not an internal function)
we uncommented the auto-inserted instrumentation. After this manual process, we concluded with
a total of 170 instrumented functions dealing with text. In a similar process, we also identified and
instrumented 61 functions dealing with the assignment of object relationships, a few examples of
these functions can be seen below.
gtk container add
gtk container add with properties
gtk widget set parent
gtk widget set parent window
gtk widget unparent
Between our discovery of the text manipulating functions and the relationship-altering functions,
we were able to fully instrument GTK+3 to report all text and hierarchy present in interfaces
created by client applications. Once completed, we took it one step further and instrumented the
single GTK+ function responsible for handling a button-click event in order to know when a user
interacted with buttons in the interface.
When an application creates or alters parts of their GTK+ powered interface, our instrumentation
activates to record the new state of the interface. The alteration of state could be the updating
of text assigned to an object, or a change in how current (or new) objects relate to one another.
Through the instrumentation of all the text assignment functions and hierarchy altering API func-
tions, we are confident in our ability to track the state of the application’s GUI. To keep persistent
records of this information, we write our logged data to disk using the GNU mkstemp function
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which will create a temporary file resident on the storage drive until one of our developed scripts
iterates over the folder and aggregates data into a permanent location. Each log entry we save con-
tains a nanosecond resolution timestamp recorded at the time of our instrumentation starting, the
GTK+ library function name responsible for causing the log entry, the text or hierarchy data to be
logged, and the memory address(es) of the objects being handled. Certain log entries also include
the calling application’s PID and path to the application’s executable on the filesystem.
Having the capability to extract not only the text, but also the hierarchy information along with
it leads to powerful contextual information. For example, simply knowing the text on the screen
can be useful, but it is even better to know if multiple blocks of text are in the same window or in
different windows. Further, it can be beneficial to indicate whether or not the text on the screen
is held within a display-only widget or if the recorded text is actually from an editable text box
and could have been entered by the user. Our instrumentation is capable of extracting sufficient
information from the interface to support making these statements.
6.3 Evaluation and Results
To determine the success of our instrumentation, we evaluate our approach both in terms of
performance, and in the efficacy of our text extraction. In terms of performance, we examine
the overheads of our instrumentation and discuss the possible impact on the user experience. For
determining if our instrumentation is effective in extracting text on the screen, we show results of
comparing screenshots of an application with the extraction logs.
6.3.1 Efficacy and Accuracy of Text Extraction
After performing our modifications to the GTK+ libraries, we test the instrumentation by execut-
ing a number of GTK+ applications. When selecting applications to test, we aimed to represent
a reasonable set which would cover normal day-to-day application use by a user.
• evolution, an email client
• epiphany, a web browser
• evince, a PDF viewer
• gedit, a text editor
• gnome-terminal, a terminal application
• gnome-calculator, a simple calculator
• pidgin, an instant messaging client
We spent time interacting with each of these applications and employing each for its intended
use-case. For example, we used evolution to read email, gedit to open and edit text files, evince to
read a PDF, and pidgin to hold an instant messaging conversation. We ensured that we navigated
the menu bars and opened up dialog boxes while in each application to fully expose the text in a
number of different windows and layouts.
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The results of our application tests can be seen in Table 6. When running the applications pidgin,
evolution, gedit and gnome-calculator, we were able to extract the majority, if not all, of the
text displayed on the screen. Most of the text we extracted from the GTK+ library was an
exact match to the information we observed on the screen; however, some of the text had an
extra underscore (“ ”) character present. These underscores, referred to as mnemonics by GTK+,
are used by application developers to indicate keyboard accelerators (shortcuts) which GTK+
handles [43]. After we removed these excess underscores, our text extraction reached perfect
accuracy.
Table 6: Efficacy and accuracy of text extraction across applications.
Words Appearing in String Matches
Application Screenshots Extraction Exact After ‘ ’ Stripped
evolution 127 113 94% 100%
epiphany 47 34 90% 100%
evince 470 37 62% 100%
gedit 57 57 82% 100%
gnome-terminal 83 58 86% 100%
gnome-calculator 32 32 100% 100%
pidgin 50 45 91% 100%
The remaining three applications: evince, epiphany, and gnome-terminal are good examples
of applications which depend on multiple graphical libraries. While our GTK+ instrumentation
worked as intended for these applications, hence some coverage of their interface, these applications
rely on additional graphics libraries to handle portions of their functionality. For example, while
browsing the web with epiphany our instrumentation was able to capture the window title, items
on the menu bar, and the URL; however, it was unable to read any of the text from within the
displayed web pages. This is because epiphany is built upon the WebKit rendering engine [44],
a library which we have not instrumented. However, it is worth noting if we were to instrument
WebKit, we would then be able to support all applications utilizing its rendering features as well
as GTK+.
Similarly, both evince and gnome-terminal use additional libraries to support their functionality.
The pdf viewer evince relies on the Poppler PDF rendering library [45] and gnome-terminal relies
on the Gnome Virtual Terminal Emulator [46] library to power the terminal display. Just as with
WebKit, if we were to instrument these libraries, we would have text extraction for all applications
which used them. Interestingly, despite these other libraries, when text is highlighted and copied
to the clipboard, we are able to extract the text through GTK+ as these applications utilize the
clipboard API of GTK+ instead of the other libraries. To capture all text, from all applications,
an organization deploying our approach would need to instrument all of the graphical libraries
utilized by applications within the organization. While this may seem like a large and onerous
task to undertake, there are significantly fewer graphical libraries than there are applications. As
we have shown, just instrumenting a single graphical library leads to successful text extraction
from many applications; by instrumenting just a few additional libraries, the number of supported
applications would increase dramatically.
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Diving a little deeper into the details, we review the effectiveness of our approach within the
pidgin instant messaging client. Not only was our approach able to successfully extracted text
such as “Options”, “Join a Chat?,” and “Mute Sounds” from the main window of the application,
we also were able to extract text from the conversation windows. We further explored this by
establishing an instant messaging conversation between two participant hosts (with one having
our GTK+ modifications) and created a new chat. We sent a few messages back and forth and
were able to observe a transcript of the chat in our extraction logs. We include an except from the
log below:
338534.758328743 32221 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0xb962f6c0 "(12:59:07 PM) "
338534.759455910 32221 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0xb962f6c0 "d:"
338534.760105082 32221 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0xb962f6c0 " "
338534.760726432 32221 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0xb962f6c0 "hello"
[ unrelated text from other apps omitted ]
338553.860663724 32221 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0xb962f6c0 "(12:59:16 PM) "
338553.872373970 32221 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0xb962f6c0 "CS:"
338553.873169254 32221 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0xb962f6c0 " "
338553.875125457 32221 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0xb962f6c0 "howdy"
As our approach creates a new log entry for each invocation of the GTK+ public API functions,
we are able to see the processing that pidgin is performing on incoming messages. First, we see
the pidgin prepended timestamp, then the author of the message (“d” and “CS”), followed by the
actual message. Additionally, we observed extracted text such as “CS has stopped typing” which
indicates we are successfully detecting even the typing notifications.
As another example, we also tested our extraction capabilities within the gedit text editor. While
using the application we observed the successful extraction of the text present on the main window,
buttons, menu-items, and even the user-editable text area. In the excerpt from our logging file
below, we can see gedit process the load of the file “file test2.” Quickly afterwards we extract the
full path of the file as gedit updates a status blurb in its main window followed by the insertion of
the file contents “Hello World!” into the editable text space. Additionally, we are able to observe
the location of the text cursor through the extraction of the current location indicator present in
the main gedit window.
340030.490457339 457 gtk_label_set_text 0x9f4d730 "file_test2"
340030.494264872 457 gtk_label_set_text 0x9f13b98 "Loading
file ’/home/cyber/file_test2’..."
340030.538422267 457 gtk_text_buffer_insert 0x9ef65c0 "Hello World\!"
340030.538854912 457 gtk_label_set_text 0x9f13d08 " Ln 2, Col 1"
When considering the deployment of our approach, a potential concern by an organization may be
the prospect of repeatedly instrumenting the graphical libraries as updates occur. Intuitively, we
would expect most if not all of the original instrumentation to be directly portable to updated code
as with large libraries code does not change drastically very frequently. To confirm this intuition
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we explored the viability of updating our GTK+ code to run on the latest release of Ubuntu:
version 14.04. In a similar effort as our original approach on 12.10, we aimed to use the exact
version of GTK+ packaged with the distribution; in the case of Ubuntu 14.04, the GTK+ versions
are 2.24.23 and 3.10.8. Since our original approach favored instrumentation in the GTK+3 version
of the library, we again focus on the newer library. We generated a list of all the locations where
we instrumented the original GTK+3 library, and then manually copied over the instrumentation
code from the 3.6.0 version (Ubuntu 12.10) to the 3.10.8 version (Ubuntu 14.04). After only a few
hours of work we had a fully operational and instrumented copy of GTK+3 working and extracting
text.
While two of our original instrumentation hooks were no longer necessary due to code refactoring,
the remaining code was equivalent. Because we simply migrated our existing instrumentation over
to the new version, it is possible that we miss text handled in newly introduced API functions.
To compensate for this, we could re-perform our systematic analysis of the code base to note any
differences between the analysis of the original 3.6.0 code base and our updated 3.10.8 version.
Alternatively, we could simply review the GTK+3 release notes for any newly introduced functions.
However, for a minimal amount of effort we already achieved extraction of a vast majority of the
text passing through the library. To make the process even quicker, organizations could simply
create a program which is able to automatically insert the instrumentation code in the correct
places and only consult a developer if a refactor in the codebase is detected.
6.3.2 Performance of Data Extraction
We assess the performance overhead of our approach by determining the amount of time our code
requires to extract the data required and save it to a file. We focus on this measurement as any
additional time taken to update the graphics on the screen can cause update lag which would
be noticable by a user. For our approach to be viable, we must have low enough overhead to
remain unnoticed by the user. To quantitatively measure the time we spend processing within
GTK+ we employ the clock gettime function to record nanosecond resolution at the beginning
our processing, and again after the log file is closed. We save the difference between the two
recorded times to a separate performance log file.
With the code for performance measurements in place, we exercised our GTK+ 3.10.8 implemen-
tation on a Ubuntu 14.04 virtual machine allocated with 2GB of RAM and four 2.6GHz cores. To
generate data, we ran a number of applications, expanded their menus, opened up dialog boxes,
and then quit the application. In all, we logged a total of 36,409 performance results. After some
analysis we removed 215 outliers from our statistical analysis as they were more than two stan-
dard deviations from the mean. We attribute the existence of these outliers to operating system
scheduling delays such as queued context switches. The statistics from our results can be seen in
Table 7.
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Table 7: Overhead time for our instrumentation to log a GTK+ API call in µs as seen through
36,409 data points. 215 points excluded from the statistics for being two times the standard
deviation greater than the mean.
Minimum Median Average 95th Percentile Maximum Standard Deviation
44.24 71.79 100.8 272.16 788.4 85.41
6.3.3 Using Data to Recreate the Operational Context
By combining our extracted text with our recorded hierachical information, or contexual awareness
becomes more powerful than the sum of the two pieces. For example, by leveraging the recorded
parent-child relationships we can construct a graph representative of the widgets created by an
application. By traversing this graph, we can learn more about the location of text than otherwise
would be possible. For example, in the excerpt of our log below we are able to trace the assignment
of text all the way up to the enclosing window by connecting objects keyed by their address in
memory. We represent the log entries below in logical order, from child to parent, instead of
temporary.
338524.036541612 32249 gtk_label_set_text 0x84b34d0 "Print"
338524.036960916 32249 0x84bacb8 0x84b34d0 gtk_widget_set_parent
338524.037202966 32249 0x84bb168 0x84bacb8 gtk_container_add
338524.033204254 32249 0x84625a0 0x84bb168 gtk_container_add
338563.405579625 32249 (nil) 0x84625a0 gtk_widget_set_parent_window
When our instrumentation records information relating to the parent-child relationships, we also
make note of the function we are receiving data from. In doing so we gain even more contextual
information about the objects being handled. For example, when an application requests that
GTK+ set the text of a drop-down menu it calls the gtk menu item set text API function. By
simply looking at the name of the function, we can reason that the object associated with that
API invocation is a GTK+ menu widget.
In Figure 3 we give an example of how our contextual information can be used to construct a
graph representing the user interface. Labeled nodes represent an object with the assigned text
show as the node label. Black nodes are one or more connected widgets without text assigned to
them. By inspecting the contents of the graph and the relative distance between the objects with
text, we are able to reason about the proximity of an object to another. This could be be used
as a quantitative metric of the relationship between textual objects on the screen and could lead
towards the development of security policies or other studies on the layout of applications. For
example, extracting the word “print” from the on-screen interface may in of itself be innocuous;
however, we could alert security systems if we see the word “print” associated with a button, and
detect known business-confidential information on the screen. A security system may then use our
information to decide any subsequent print attempt from that host should be denied.
Using the extracted data, we can also begin to make statements about the behavior of applications
as recorded by the Linux Auditing Subsystem. For example, as shown in the abbreviated log
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Figure 3: Graph depicting a subset of the relationship of text elements in the GTK+ container
hierarchy for the gedit application.
excerpt below, we observe the assignment of the text “Save” to a label which is then assigned to
a button.
1423590487.994 gtk_label_set_text_with_mnemonic 0x9cfc170 19244
"/usr/bin/gedit" "_Save"
1423590487.994 19244 0x9cfc0b8 0x9cfc170 gtk_widget_add_mnemonic_label
1423590492.490 19244 0x9cfc0b8 EVENT-ButtonPress
1423590492.742:2458703 type=PATH : item=0 inode=590808 mode=file,664
name=/home/test_user/test_document
1423590492.742:2458703 : cwd=/home/scapegoat
1423590492.742:2458703 type=SYSCALL : arch=i386 syscall=open success=yes
exit=11 pid=19244
At some point in the future, this button is activated by the user which causes a chain of system
events to occur. According to the Linux Auditing System, gedit opens, writes to, and then closes
the file “home/test user/test document.” Using our extracted text and generated context graph
we can provide background information indicating what the user observed on the screen, and then
most importantly, identify the cause of the system actions: a button press by the user.
7 Fusion of the Sensors
To evaluate the effectiveness of our sensors in describing user interaction on a system, we interacted
with our system to perform a series of tasks which an end user would normally do. In this section
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we will describe our testing methodology and the actions we performed while our sensors extracted
information from the interface. We then evaluate how well our approach performed by reviewing
the performance data of each sensor and how well our sensors are able to describe the user activity
which occurred on the system.
7.1 Testing Methodology
When creating our methodology, we aim to fully exercise all of our sensors and also record the ac-
tions all processes running under our testing user. We prepared our system by first creating a new
user, “demo,” under which the test would be run. To provide us with some files to interact with,
we placed a two minute long video clip of an open-source movie [47], and a text file named “hel-
loworld.txt” containing simply “HelloworldFile” as its contents. In order to monitor the activity of
processes running under the demo user, we use the Linux Auditing Subsystem to monitor system
call invocations. To configure the auditing subsystem towards our needs, we edited the configura-
tion file (/etc/audit/auditd.conf) to instruct the auditing system to perform high-performance
buffered logging. We then edited the auditing rules file (/etc/audit/audit.rules) and inserted
the following commands (indented lines are a continuation of the previous line).
-a exit,never -F arch=b32 -F euid=1001 -F dir=/home/doransmestad/ -S open
-S close -S fork -S execve -S clone -S socketcall
-a exit,never -F arch=b64 -F euid=1001 -F dir=/home/doransmestad/ -S open
-S close -S fork -S execve -S clone
-a exit,always -F arch=b32 -F euid=1001 -S open -S close -S fork -S execve
-S clone -S socketcall
-a exit,always -F arch=b64 -F euid=1001 -S open -S close -S fork -S execve
-S clone
At a high level, the commands indicate to the Linux Auditing Subsystem that we wish to log the
following system calls: open, close, fork, execve, clone, and socketcall. We selected this subset of
the system calls to keep the volume of the log low while giving us insight into file and network
operations processes are performing. Given the power of the auditing subsystem, we need to
be precise when indicating what we wish to log. As such, whenever auditing system calls, the
audit subsystem needs to know if we wish to instrument the 32 bit or 64 bit version of the calls.
To be thorough, we indicate the to system that we wish to log both. This requires two very
similar commands which we will refer to as a ‘pair’. The first pair of commands tells the auditing
subsystem to exclude the home directory where our sensors save their log data, no need to audit
our own logs. The second pair of commands indicate that we wish to record invocations of the
aforementioned system calls only when the user owning the process is our demo user (whose uid
is 1001). We note there is slight difference between these pairs as the 64 bit system calls have no
socketcall listing and therefore is not monitored for 64 bit processes.
With the foundation for our test laid, we test our implementation by performing the following tasks
on a Ubuntu Desktop 14.04 virtual machine with 2GB of RAM and four 2.6GHz CPU cores:
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1. Clear out our sensor’s logs
2. Reboot the virtual machine
3. Start wall-clock stopwatch
4. Using the graphical interface, authenticate as our demo user
5. Move the mouse cursor around the screen, dragging and clicking objects on the desktop
6. Launch gnome-terminal, list a few directories, then launch applications
7. Launch the default Ubuntu video player, totem, and watch our two minute video
8. Launch the Chromium Browser and read two web-based news articles
9. Launch the text-editor gedit
10. Using gedit, open our “Helloworld.txt” file and type a few paragraphs of text
11. Collect the log files
7.2 Evaluation
We evaluate the results of our test by reviewing the events recorded in our sensor’s logs then
by analyzing the performance overhead of our approach. We perform simple aggregation and
analysis with a few scripts we wrote to provide insight into the recorded data, and by extension,
the interactions occurring with the user interface.
7.2.1 Analysis of Sensor Data
We begin by studying the log data from our Kernel sensor to obtain the reported consumers of
input from the input devices. Our kernel sensor recorded 7,960 events related to the capture of
the user input devices. Interestingly the X Windowing System was not the only process which
attempted an open to of the devices. We saw evidence indicating that “systemd-logind”, “acpid”,
“plymouthd”, and two shell scripts also attempted to open the keyboard, but never subsequently
read any input. We discount them from further consideration. As expected, and can be viewed
in the log except below, our kernel sensor indicates that our X Windowing System, noted as “X,”
opened the input devices.
Open pid:1136 fd:7 exe:X file:/dev/tty7 perf:387
[ unrelated log entries hidden ]
Open pid:1136 fd:10 exe:X file:/dev/input/mice perf:1052
Open pid:1136 fd:10 exe:X file:/dev/input/mice perf:655
Open pid:1136 fd:10 exe:X file:/dev/input/mice perf:997
Upon further inspection of the logs in an aggregate form, we are able to note that the X Windowing
System invoked the read system call 7427 times to grab input from the keyboard and mouse. To
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further separate the out the details it can also be observed from the aggregate data that X consumed
3,574 bytes from file descriptor 7 (keyboard input) and 20,347 bytes from the file descriptor 10
(mice input). Based upon our measurements when evaluating the kernel sensor (Section 4.3.2),
we estimate there were approximately 1,800 keyboard presses and at least a few minutes of mouse
input.
To verify this claim, we move on to inspecting the results of the X11 sensor. During our tests the
X11 sensor logged 70,618 events. We aggregated these events and distilled them down to 622 entries
describing the processes which connects with the X Windowing System interface. Surprisingly,
there were a number of applications which established the connection to the X Windowing System,
but then never used the connection to display data. To further filter the aggregate data we remove
from consideration processes which we have: no more than twenty graphical outputs, zero mouse
inputs, and zero keyboard inputs. This simple filter removed 614 processes which only connect to
the XServer without actually causing user interaction beyond that.
With the non-interacting programs removed from consideration, we are left with the eight processes
below. Four of these processes are the applications we intended to launch, and the other four are
system processes responsible for powering the user interface. For brevity, we collapsed applications
with multiple process identifiers and instead represent the sum of their events.
Client PID Output Keyboard Mouse Output/Input Ratio
"nautilus" 3023 1054 10 412 40%
"bamfdaemon" 2101 2 57 616 336%
"compiz" 2902 47448 0 0 0%
"gnome-terminal" 3659 485 354 289 173%
"gedit" 9395 1502 2985 0 199%
"chromium-browse" 8891 4930 0 3743 76%
"totem" 3777 3351 16 400 12%
"unity-greeter" 1345 61 22 11 54%
We first notice that the summation of our X11’s captured keyboard events compared to the kernel
sensor’s is nearly correct: 1722 keystrokes (3444 X11 events, one for KeyPress, one for KeyRelease)
to the Kernel’s approximately 1800 keystrokes. The difference we attribute to a combination of
approximation error and the possibility of certain infrequent actions within X11 not being fully
logged. Despite the difference, our ability to verify that our X11 sensor is correctly capturing
nearly all, if not all, keystrokes reinforces the validity of the sensor in the X11 sensor.
Through the use of the X11 sensor data we are able to perform some reasoning concerning pro-
cesses and their user-interaction. To aid our understanding, we categorize the processes into
groupings based upon the way each process interacts with the user. Applications with high
user input, or “input-heavy,” are: bamfdaemon, gnome-terminal, gedit, unity-greeter, and
chromium-browser. The only application with moderate user-input, or “input-balanced,” is
nautilus. Finally, the applications which mainly send information to the user, or “output-heavy,”
are: compiz and totem.
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According to this categorization of processes, we are able to separate the applications which simply
appear on the screen from applications which may be actively engaged in completing user-driven
tasks. In doing so we are able to say with certainty that the user acknowledges the application and
drives actions the processes are performing. Unfortunately, our X11 sensor has no way of knowing
what the user is actually observing within each window of the applications they use. While we are
able to connect the user to the process, more information is needed in order to comprehend the
user’s intentions when interacting with a process’ on-screen representation.
To gain further insight into what may be occurring within these processes, we employ our GTK+
sensor. With our instrumentation, we extract the information upon which the interface the user
observes is constructed, and reconstruct it for automated reasoning. To best understand why a
user initiated a certain action, we study actions with a catalyst. While our GTK+ sensor logs
every bit of the user interface it processes, one way of reasoning about the data is to reconstruct
the contextual information of an interface immediately after the user presses a button. Our in-
strumentation received 12 button presses from 2 processes. We discuss just one recorded button
press: when a button was clicked within the gedit application leading to reading a file from the
disk.
When running through the steps in our evaluation, we proceeded to open gedit, use gedit’s open-
file window to browse to the text file we wished to edit, then open the file. By constructing a graph
with the connected components of the graphical user interface at the time immediately surrounding
the button press, we are able to inspect the state of the interface when the user decided to press the
button. We present a representation of the reconstructed relationships between displayed objects
in Table 8. The relationships indicates the button pressed, labeled “gtk-open”, was placed on a
“GtkFileChooserDialog.” Nearby elements were set with the labels “Open” and “ Open” leading
us to believe that the dialog the button press occurred was the save dialog.
Table 8: A flat depiction of the reconstructed GUI object graph as seen by the GTK+ sensor.
Distance from Function Name Text Parenting Function
Button
1 gtk buildable set name ”dialog-action area1” gtk widget set parent
2 gtk buildable set name ”dialog-vbox1” gtk dialog add button
1 gtk window set title ”Open” gtk dialog add button
gtk buildable set name ”GtkFileChooserDialog” gtk dialog add button
2 gtk button new with label ”gtk-cancel” gtk widget add mnemonic label
0 gtk dialog add button ”gtk-open”
gtk button new with label ”gtk-open”
gtk button set label ”gtk-open”
1 gtk widget create pango layout ”Open” gtk widget add mnemonic label
gtk label new with mnemonic ” Open” gtk widget add mnemonic label
gtk label set text with mnemonic ” Open” gtk widget add mnemonic label
1 gtk widget create pango layout ”home” gtk widget set parent
gtk label set text ”home” gtk widget set parent
gtk label new with mnemonic ”gtk-open” gtk widget set parent
gtk label set text with mnemonic ”gtk-open” gtk widget set parent
gtk label new ”gtk-open” gtk widget set parent
With this information in hand, we can then temporally match the detection of a file-open dialog
to system audit logs handling the opening and reading from a particular file. In doing so, we note
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the presence of the following log entry:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1429852855.731:379764): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=yes exit=21 a0=1d6c7a0 a1=0 a2=0 a3=185aa80 items=1 ppid=3680
pid=9422 auid=4294967295 uid=1001 gid=1001 euid=1001 suid=1001
fsuid=1001 egid=1001 sgid=1001 fsgid=1001 tty=pts1 ses=4294967295
comm="pool" exe="/usr/bin/gedit" key=(null)
type=CWD msg=audit(1429852855.731:379764): cwd="/home/demo"
type=PATH msg=audit(1429852855.731:379764): item=0
name="/home/demo/Desktop/helloworld.txt" inode=2327447
dev=fc:00 mode=0100644 ouid=1001 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00 nametype=NORMAL
This audit log, though verbose, shows that the process with pid 9422 (gedit), opened the file
/home/demo/Desktop/helloworld.txt approximately a tenth of a second after the button click
was registered in gedit.
As our GTK+ sensor is run completely under the user’s privileges (outside of the rusted computing
base), we wish to verify that the actions GTK+ is report are actually occurring. A few possible
approaches in order to perform this correlation rely on determining the overlap of information, or
obvious contradictions in such data, in which we are able to ensure we receive matching information.
We suggest that a temporal relation between a GTK+ button press and the kernel and X11 sensors
indicating a keyboard or mouse input are present. Additionally, we suggest a comparison between
the quantitative amount information held by GTK+ be reconciled with X11’s categorization of
an applications input-type. That is, if GTK+ is reporting vast amount of context, but X11 never
handled a screen presence, we would believe GTK+ did indeed render an interface but it never
showed up on the screen.
Our system, by being able to provide the data able to connect the user all the way down to
the system actions which result, can aid in our understanding of actions on the system. Our
experimental validation of our system in this section shows that we are able to successfully identify
the XServer as the only process reading raw input device information. We then show which
processes have communicated with the XServer and have received copies of user-input as delivered
from the XServer. With the list of applications in hand, we are then able to study the context of
user actions as viewed by the user themselves through the automated extraction of text processed
by the GTK+ graphics library. Utilizing this data to identify and even attribute actions on the
system caused by the user become simpler. Instead of attempting to guess if a user caused an
action on the system, any tool can leverage our approach to track which processes have accepted
user input, and greatly reduce the pool of suspect processes during a security audit.
8 Discussion
Below we briefly discuss relevant aspects to the overall functionality of our approach, and some
potential applications for our instrumentation of the GUI.
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8.1 Disk Space
Running our three sensors at all times quickly requires a significant amount of disk space. For
example, over the 17 minute capturing of data on our machines resulted in nearly 4MB of GTK+
logs, 12MB of X11 logs, and 1MB of kernel logs. This will lead to an aggregate log size of
over 1.5GBs in just a 24-hour period. While our performance overheads are minimal, our disk
presence is quite significant. We propose that any potential deployers make efforts to keep their
disks from completely filling up. Alternative methods such as storing all log information on a
network server, database server, or automatically compressed partition would also be able to
provide benefits.
8.2 Application Domains
As our approach is a generic way to instrument the graphical user interface, our data can be used
to aid in a number of areas. We explore a few possibilities below.
8.2.1 Usability Studies
To test the effectiveness of graphical interface layouts to communicate their meaning to an end-
user, GUI designers usually run usability studies. There are three main types of usability studies:
empirical, formal, and informally [48]. The empirical studies bring in human subjects and ask
that they navigate through some designed interface while monitored. Formal and informal studies
are cheaper solutions needing only a single expert or automated system to judge the viability
of specific designs based upon prior experience [48]. While our approach could be leveraged in
automated studies to determine the link-distance of various GUI objects, we focus our discussion
on our instrumentation’s ability to record user actions.
One of the main reasons that empirical usability studies are avoided is because of their high cost
and challenges in recruiting a sufficiently diverse set of users to study. A few products, such as
Google Chrome and Firefox attempt to resolve this by packaging their own sets of instrumentation
and simply allowing the user to choose to self-report data. These forms of usability studies are
not as formally defined and users may take whichever path through the program they wish, at
any time. Nonetheless, they provide valuable feedback for the developers of web-browsers so that
they can continue improving their product. Using our already existing sensors, we can provide this
insight for the entire operating system, including individual programs which would otherwise not
have such instrumentation.
Furthermore, we can extend the idea of these usability studies to include organizational wide
metrics for application usage. For example, a business manager may wish to know if the costly
licensed software is actively being used by the organization’s employees or not. It may very well be
that employees are still using Microsoft PowerPoint to create diagrams instead of using Microsoft
Visio. Or, employees do use Visio, but only for simplistic drawings which could easily be powered
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by an open-source alternative. As another example, an organization would like to know how much
time their employees spend in their web browsers instead of accomplishing business tasks: through
our existing sensors we can quantitatively state the amount of user input to web browsers which
correlates to the time spent in the application.
8.2.2 Security
The identification of protection against malware and other system security threats depends upon
having actionable intelligence. Whether that is an anti-virus signature or an anomaly-based in-
trusion detection system, each requires data sets to process. Our sensors can be used directly
for these purposes. By tracking which processes are interacted with by the user, we can inform
security systems which applications have earned some level of ‘endorsement’ from the user. That
is, an application which goes through the work of creating a user-interface and interacting with the
user can be differentiated from a hidden process which performs actions without the user knowing.
While there are categorizes of malware, just as a trojan-horse, which would be passed over by this
naive approach, being able to provide the additional insight to a process’ actions can aid in the
detection of abnormal behaviors.
Our sensors could further be used within a network control paradigm. For example, if the host
is operating within a software defined network (SDN) which deploys access control nodes on each
end-host our data could become a valuable resource when writing policies. With our data a network
administrator could require that a process interact with the user prior to allowing the outbound
network traffic. While such a policy does require an end-host client for SDNs to communicate
the data up to the network controller, contemporary work by Douglas MacFarland is already
implementing such an approach [49]. A number of other security-focused applications are possible,
but our main contribution to the security space is our data available for analytic by existing security
solutions. More data allows for these system to produce better decisions, leading to an increase in
security.
8.3 Ethical and Legal Considerations
As is true with any monitoring and data-collection system, ethical and legal considerations must
be taken into account. Our sensors examine the information flow between various points in the
graphical user interface and in the case of GTK+ actively extract information from the screen. Due
to our presence in privileged areas, our sensors are able to intercept all user keystrokes and screen
content. As such, we are able to log any password the user types and also extract possibly sensitive
material from the screen such as a social security number, bank account information, or private
communications. However, any other security solution installed will also be able to retrieve this
sensitive information. In fact, commonly installed anti-virus solutions must open, read, process,
and potentially report upon all files residing upon the host system.
Existing organizations and enterprises already understand these potentially problematic privacy
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issues and respond by requiring all of their employees to explicitly acknowledge they may be
monitored while using organizational equipment. These warnings are usually presented upon login
through user agreements or through dissemination of agreements in which employees are required
to waive their privacy rights. Under these conditions, we believe that the use of our sensors is both
legal and ethical. However, as with any tool potentially able to breach privacy boundaries, it is up
to the deployer of our sensors to ensure their ethical use.
9 Future Work
Through the implementation and evaluation of our sensors we identified areas where our approach
can be improved and expanded upon in the future. We discuss these areas below.
9.1 Instrument Additional Graphics Libraries
To support the extraction of context from additionally applications instrumentation of more graph-
ics libraries is required. While our current GTK+ sensor works well in extracting context from
the processes which employ its services, additional applications such as the PDF viewer evince
use alternative libraries for the rending of the PDF contents. We specifically focus on the web
browsing libraries such as WebKit and Gecko as the best next step. As web browsing has become
ubiquitous over the past years, being able to see into the user’s browser will greatly increase our
coverage of common applications used by the end-user.
9.2 Refine the X11 Sensor
Below we discuss a few aspects in which improvements can be made to our X11 sensor.
9.2.1 Tracing the Event Data Flow
In creating the X11 Sensor, we place instrumentation the best place possible to capture both input
events and output requests as they passed through the system. In doing so, we were able to
capture nearly all of the events with perfect accuracy. However, there are occasional cases where
our instrumentation is not fully complete. For example, when a process requests a ‘grab,’ to claim
exclusive access to the keyboard and/or mouse our instrumentation is not fully able to log the flow
of events. In future work, we aim to fully trace the flow of events and locate the infrequent flows
which circumvent our instrumentation. Once identified, we aim to refactor our code to remain
efficient and expedient while ensuring all events are fully captured.
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9.2.2 Calculating Window Visibility
When determining whether or not a window is visible to the user we simply perform a few com-
parisons against the internal XServer data structures. If we are returned a value indicating that
the window is only partially visible, our current code treats the window as if it were fully exposed.
In the future, we want to handle this more carefully and calculate the actual window area exposed
based upon the XServer’s indication of the exposed portions. By doing so we will be able to fur-
ther refine our quantification of a process’ output, which will lead to a better and more accurate
characterization of the user-process interactions on a machine.
9.3 Determining the User’s Intention
With our three sensor system we are able to following user data from the kernel, to X11, and
up to the GTK+ library. Our future work will look into extending our understanding to the
users themselves. In particular, we want to study how users perceive an application on the screen
and indicate an intention. This could be intending to the close the application by clicking an exit
button, or indicating the desire to open a file by interacting with a file-open dialog. By establishing
the intention held by the user we can begin to reason about process behavior which deviates from
the expected actions to fulfill the intention. We believe such data would be highly useful towards
the security field.
10 Conclusion
Modern computer systems are complex. As such, it can be difficult to understand the behavior of
the system and why certain actions are occurring. In our approach, we proposed and implemented
sensors capable of extracting information from the graphical user interface in order to identify the
processes which interacted with the user. By knowing this information, we are able to enrich the
situational awareness of the events occurring within a system and therefore provide insights towards
the root cause of system events. We showed that our instrumentation was effective in characterizing
different types of applications with an on-screen presence, and further we provided data towards
the determination of user intentions. We also proved that obtaining the information from the user
interface can be done in an efficient manner with minimal overhead allowing our approach to be
deployed across an organization without causing any significant processing delays.
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